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COMMENTS

INTERNATIONAL

LAW-BONDED

LABOR

IN

INDIA-Bandhua Mukti

Morcha v. Union of India - Among the many problems facing India
today is the existence of bonded labor, a practice involving one of the
most egregious deprivations of liberty and human dignity known to
mankind. Despite the formal prohibitions and governmental prescriptive efforts, debt bondage' still persists in India. In Bandhua Mukti
Morcha v. Union of India,' the Supreme Court of Indias addressed the
problem of bonded labor and the related problem of inhuman working
of stone quarry workers and their families in the
and living conditions
4
Haryana.
of
State
Article 23 of the Indian Constitution5 prohibits "[traffic in human
1. The phrase "debt bondage" is used synonymously with the phrase "bonded labor."
Mohamed Awad, U.N. Economic and Social Council Special Rapporteur on Slavery,
U.N. Doc E/4168/Rev. 1, 75 (1966) (hereinafter U.N. Report on Slavery).

2. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) 802.
3. For a description and analysis of the Indian Supreme Court, see G.

SCHUBERT

&

D.J. DANELSKI, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR 221-59 (1960).

4. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) 802, 805-06. The Court cited the following government studies
that evidenced contemporary existence of bonded labor: Report of the Centre for Rural
Development Administration, India Institute of Public Administration to the Ministry of
Labour, "Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour in Moghyn District, Bihar;" Report of the
Public Policy and Planning of the Indian Institute of Public Administration to the Ministry of Labour, "Evaluation Study of Bonded Labour-Rehabilitation Scheme in
Tehri-Garwal, V.P.;" Report on Laxmi Dhar Misra, Director-General (Labour Welfare)
based on "On the Spot Studies Regarding Indemnification, Release of Bonded Labourers
and Rehabilitation of Freed Labourers in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra
Pradesh, Karnatakay, Orissa, Bihar, Rajasthan, Taminadu and Kerala," and the Report
of the National Seminar on "Identificaton and Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour," February 7-9, 1983. Id. The Court stated that bonded labor was found mainly in stone quarries and brick kilns. Id. at 829.
5. Enacted on January 26, 1950, the Indian Constitution was formulated by an indirectly elected Constituent Assembly and created a federal republic of fifteen states. On
the central level, the executive power was vested in the President. The President was
elected by an electoral college comprised of members of the central legislature and state
legislatures.
Central legislative power was vested in a bicameral house. The Rajya Sabha or upper house, is comprised of 250 members and the Lok Sabha, lower house, consists of 500
members.
Members of the Supreme Court and central high courts were to be appointed by the
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beings and begars and other similar forms of forced labour.", The
Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act of 1976 [Bonded Labour Act],7
enacted pursuant to article 23, prohibits all practices of bonded labor.
Justice Bhagwati, writing for the Bandhua Mukti Morcha court, relied
on these two laws and other constitutional and statutory norms in providing specific sanctions to eliminate the current practice of bonded
labor in the State of Haryana.'
Debt bondage is a system of usury under which a debtor and his
descendants or dependents are forced by creditors to work without reasonable or legal wages, or with no wages whatsoever, to extinguish a
presumed debt.9 Deprivations of wealth, respect, skill and education
are primary contributing factors to the practice of bonded labor.1"
Bonded laborers, a group consisting mainly of Scheduled Castes,11
executive, Supreme Court justices were protected from removal by the requirement of a
two-thirds majority in each house for impeachment. The central judiciary was vested
with original and appellate jurisdiction, and was given the right of judicial review.
Under the Indian Constitution either the Constituent Assemblies, the Legislature, or
the general electorate (by ratification) can amend the Constitution. By January 25, 1980,
there were a total of 45 amendments to the Indian Constitution. See A.P. BLAUSTEIN,
CONSTrrUTIONS OF THE CouNTRIsS OF THE WORLD, INDIA, 9-10 (1980). See also P.R
GHOSH, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, How IT HAS BEEN FRAMED (1966).
6. INDIAN CONST. art. 23(1) (emphasis in original). Begar is an Indian term used to
denote a form of forced labor under which a person is compelled to work without remuneration. Asiad Construction Workers, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 456, 485-86. See also S. MITRA,
LEGAL AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY (Calcutta 1973) (defining begar ss "forced labour,
compulsory and uncompensated service.").
7. Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act of 1976, INDIA A.IR. MtNuAL, Vol. 2 (4th
ed. 1979) [hereinafter Bonded Labour Act].
8. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) 802, 805.
9. See The Bonded Labour Act supra note 7. "At times, several generations work
under bondage for the repayment of a paltry sum which had been taken by some remote
ancestor. The interest rates are exhorbitant and such bondage cannot be interpreted as
the result of any legitimate contract or agreement." Id. at 33-34.
"Bonded labour system" is defined in § 2, cl. (g) of the Bonded Labour Act, 1976.
See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
10. U.N. Report on Slavery, supra note 1 at 75. "Poverty and ignorance seem to be
responsible for some of these people falling prey to the usurious money-lenders." Id.

11. See generally P.U.

KANE, 2 HISTORY OF DHARMASASTRA (ANCIEIqT AND MEDIAEVAL

23 (1941). Common to all conceptions of the caste system are
the following features: (1) heredity, a theory that man is assigned to a particular caste by
birth into that caste; (2) endogany and exogamy, restrictions relating to marriage; (3)
restrictions concerning food, what food and water may be taken and from whom it may
be taken; (4) occupation, strict limitations on permissible work; (5) gradation of castes,
stratification of individuals on a social scale ranging as low as untouchability.
Member- of castes are conditioned early in life to view their superior or inferior
status as a "natural" or "divine" expression of the will of God and are taught to be
content with their pre-determined stations in society. See generally M.S. McDoUGAL,
H.B. LASWELL, LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC O9DER (1980) [hereRELIGIOUS AND CIVIL LAW)
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Scheduled Tribes 12 and landless agricultural workers, often subject
themselves to bondage because they lack the most basic resources of
well being."
In the instant case, plaintiff Bandhua Mukti Morcha, a public interest organization devoted to the eradication of bonded labor in India,
complained to the Court about the existence of bonded labor in the
State of Haryana.1 According to the plaintiff's survey of stone quarries
in the Faridabad district of the state, over forty bonded laborers were
working in those quarries."
The plaintiff detailed the prevalence of bonded labor, and also described the inhuman conditions under which the laborers were working. 6 The plaintiff characterized numerous injuries and illnesses as resulting from safety and health violations.17 This was primarily because
no training was provided for dynamiting and stone crushing and no
compensation or medical treatment was provided for the "innumerable
cases of fatal and serious injuries"' 8 caused by such work. For example,
unregulated stone-dust pollution created a prevalence of tuberculosis." e
A report submitted by two Court appointed advocates, Ashok
Srivastava and Ashok Panda, (Srivastava/Panda Report) confirmed the
plaintiff's allegations and listed specific numerous cases of bonded labor."0 By way of example, the workers and their families were forced to
drink polluted water, live in thatched roof "jhuggies" and do without
any type of latrines or washing facilities.' The Report described in
inafter Human Rights].
Although India is commonly cited as the "contemporary paradign of caste society,"
other countries exhibit "indicia of high stratification and immobility." For example, Japan, Indonesia, Tamiland, Polynesia and Afghanistan exhibit "severe class differentiations [which] approximate the hierarchial and heredity deprivations characteristic of
'caste,' and the children who begin with little continue to be inordinately and permanently handicapped vis-a-vis the children who begin with much." See HUMAN RIGHTS,

supra at 512 and works cited therein. See also P.T. BORALE,

SEGREGAION AND DESEGRE-

(1968) and J. M. DERRT 'r, RELIGION LAW AND THE STATE IN INDIA, (1968).
12. See supra note 11.
13. Tribal people may incur their bonded debt to pay for the "bride price" for example. U.N. Report on Salvery, supra note 7 at 170. "Bride Price" is defined as "goods or
valuables transferred by the groom's kin to recompense the bride's relatives for her absence." MARVIN HARRIS, AN INT14ODUCTION TO GENERAL ANTHROPOLICY (1975).
14. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 807-08.
15. Id. at 807.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The plaintiff also claimed that an illegal system of "Thekedars" or middlemen, extracted 30% of the miners' paltry wages as commission. Id. at 808.
20. Id.
21. Id.
GATION
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detail the truly miserable working and living conditions of the laborers
and their families in the Godhokhor stone quarries of Haryana."
A letter written by the plaintiff on February 25, 1982 addressed to
the Supreme Court contained these allegations of bonded labor in the
Faridabad district. 8 The Court treated this letter as a writ petition
and issued notice on it February 26, 1982. ' On March 5, 1982, the writ
petition came up for hearing. 5 The Court then ordered that copies of
the Srivastava/Panda Report be provided to all the defendant mine
lessees and owners of the stone crushers to enable them an opportunity
to file a reply to the Report." The Court also appointed Dr. Patwardhan of the Indian Institute of Technology to conduct a socio-legal
investigation of the stone quarries.2 7
By the Court's direction, the State of Haryana agreed to deposit a
sum of 1500 rupies to meet the expenses of the Patwardhan investigation." The Court also issued a preliminary order for the release of the
bonded laborers named in the Srivastava/Panda Report, and relied
upon the Additional Solicitor General of Haryana's representation that
potable water would be immediately provided for the workers.2 "
The Indian Constitution provides that "[no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."8s0 The Indian Supreme Court in Francis Cornlie
Mullins v. W.C. Khambra s1 has interpreted that article in the Constitution to mandate a fundamental right of every citizen "to live with
3' 2
human dignity, free from exploitation.
In People's Union for Democratic Rights and Others v. Union of
India and Others [Asiad Construction Workers case],3 3 the Court held
22. Id.
23. Id. at 807-08.
24. Id. at 808.
25. Id. at 809.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Court directed that Dr. Patwardhan carry out this "with a view to putting forward a scheme for improving the living conditions for the workers working in the
stone quarries." Id. The Patwardhan Report further confirmed the plaintiffs allegations.
Id. at 821.
28. Id. at 810.
29. Id. The Court subsequently noted that although the State of liaryana agreed to
supply drinking water, none in fact was provided. Id.
30. INDIAN CONST., Part III, art. 21.
31. 1980 A.I.R. (S.C.) 849.
32. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 811. See also Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 A.I.R.
(S.C.) 597.
33. 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1473. I1 this case, laborers were recruited and employed under
conditions similar to those in the instant case to perform construction work for the Asian
Games in Delhi. Id.
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that every form of forced labor is prohibited by article 231" and that it
is immaterial whether or not the laborer was somehow remunerated. 5
Article 23, the Court reasoned, was designed to protect individuals not
only against the State but also against private citizens.3"
'In reaching its decision in the Asiad Construction Workers case,
the Court stated that the Constituent Assembly considered article 4 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights3 7 and deliberately drafted
article 23 to proscribe conduct beyond that prohibited by article 4.38 In
interpreting article 23, the court also noted:
This Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may
manifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is
contrary to basic human values. The practice of forced labour
is condemned in almost every international instrument dealing
with human rights. . . as far back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into being, [the] International Labour Organization adopted Convention No. 29
laying down that every member of the International Labour
Organization which ratifies this convention shall "supress the
use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms" and this
prohibition was elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted by
the International Labor Organization in 1957. The words
"forced or compulsory labour" in Covention No. 29 had, of
course, a limited meaning but that was on account of the restricted definition of these words given in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention of Human
Rights and Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights also prohibit forced or compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the same strain and it enacts a prohibition against
forced labour in whatever form it may be found. 9
The Asiad Construction Workers Court also relied on Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India for the proposition that the Court should
expand the ambit of the fundamental rights provisions of the Indian
34. INDIAN CONST., art. 23(1). See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
35. 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1473, 1486. The defendant State of Delhi argued that article 23
only prohibits forced labor that is accompanied by some form of remuneration. Id.
36. Id. at 1474.
37. Id. at 1487. Article 4 states: "No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery
and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms." Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 73 (1948).
38. 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 1486. "Slave trade" as prohibited by article 4 was changed to
"traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour." Id.
39. Id. at 1487.
40. 1978 A.I.R. (S.C.) 597.
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Constitution, rather than dilute their meaning and content."
Enacted pursuant to article 23, the Bonded Labour Act"2 includes
specific prohibitions and sanctions regarding bonded labor systems.
Section 2(g) of the Act defines "bonded labour system" as:
The system of forced, or partly forced labour under which a
debtor enters . . . or is presumed to have entered, into an
agreement with the creditor to the effect that, (i) in considera-

tion of an advance obtained by him or by any of his lineal ascendents or decendants (whether or not such advance is evidenced by any document) and in consideration of the interest,
if any, due on such advance, or (ii) in pursuance of any customary social obligation, or (iii) for any economic consideration received by him or by any of his lineal ascendants or descendants, he would (1) render, by himself or through any member of his family,
or any person dependent on him, labour or service to the
creditor, or for the benefit of the creditor, for a specified period or for an unspecified period, either without wages or for
nominal wages, or (2) forfeit the freedom of employment or
other means of livelihood for a specified period or for an unspecified period, or (3) forfeit the right to move freely
throughout the territory of India, or (4) forfeit the right to
appropriate or sell at market value any of his property or
product of his labour or the labour of a member of his family or any person dependent on him.'"
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act terminated all previously existing
bonded debts upon commencement of the Act." Sections 10, 11 and 12

required that all District Magistrates seek4 out and eradicate all traces
of bonded labour from their jurisdictions.
Sections 13, 14 and 15 provided for the establishment of Vigilance
Committees in every district and district subdivision in India.46 These
committees were responsible for ensuring compliance with the Act, ad41. 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 1487. The issue in Maneka Gandhi case was whether the
right to travel out of the country was part of personal liberty as provided in articles 14,
19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Court held that this right was embodied in the
Constitution and that the plaintiffs passport could only be impounded by a quasi-judicial proceeding and not by an ex parte order. Id.
42. Bonded Labour Act, supra note 7.
43. Id. § 2(g).
44. Id. §§ 4, 5, 6.

45. Id. §§ 10, 11, 12.
46. Id. §§ 13, 14, 15.
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vising District Magistrates of efforts that should have been taken to
enforce the Act and for providing the economic and social rehabilitation of the freed laborers.47 Section 15 places the burden of disproving
a violation of the Att, alleged by a particular Vigilance Committee or
laborer upon the creditor. "'
Part IV of the Indian Constitution, entitled Directive Principles of
State Policy ' s requires that the federal and state governments "strive
to minimize the inequalities in income, and endeavor to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or
engaged in different vocations."'
The Directive Principles differ from the Fundamental Rights of
Part 1115' in that the principles are not enforceable in the courts of
India.5 2 Notwithstanding the nonjusticiability of the Directive Princi47. Id.
48. Id. § 15.
49. INDIAN CONST., part IV, arts. 36-51. "The Directive Principles set forth the economic, social, and political goals of the Indian Constitutional system." Id. See also WILLIAM

0. DOUGLAS,

STITUTIONAL LAW

FROM MARSHALL TO MUKHERJEA, STUDIES IN AMERICAN AND INDIAN CON-

(1956).

Article 39, for example, mandates equality in resource distribution, maintenance of
an equal distribution of wealth and equal pay for men and women. INDIAN CONST., art.
39.
50.

INDIAN CONST., art. 38(2).

51. INDIAN CONST., part III; see supra notes 30-48 and accompanying text.
52. Id. art. 37. The Directives were based on the Irish Constitution. "Their utility lies
in the fact that although they are not enforceable by any court, they being fundamental
principles in governance of the country, the State should apply these principles in the
government and in the administration and also should apply these principles in making
the laws in the country." P.B. MUKHAYI, THREE ELzmErNrAL PROBLEMS OF THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION (1972).
See also His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalauaru v. State of Kerala,
[1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1. (See infra note 55 and accompanying text). The Directive Principles also differ from the Fundamental Rights provisions in the following manner: The
Directives must be implemented by legislation, and absent any law carrying out a Directive policy, neither the States nor individuals can violate any existing law or legal right
under color of following a Directive. Mangru v. Commissioners of Budge Budge, 1953
A.I.R. (Cal. L.J.) 333, 334. The Courts cannot declare a law void on the ground that it
contravenes any of the Directive Principles. Deep Chand v. State of Utter Pradesh, 1959
A.I.R. (S.C.) 648. See generally D.D.BASU, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (1977) [hereinafter BASU].
Lauterpacht distinguished three categories of human rights: Personal rights such as
freedom of speech, assembly and press, political rights such as the right to elect by free
and secret ballot the officers of one's government, and social and economic rights such as
the right to public assistance. H. Lauterpacht, InternationalLaw and Human Rights, 64
HARv.L. REv. 519 (1950-51).
The fundamental rights of Part III would include the first two groups and the Direc-
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pies, courts in India have relied on them to define the constitutional
obligations of the States6 and to interpret and give meaning to the
Fundamental Rights provisions. 4 Courts have also construed the Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights as supplementing each
other,55 despite the tension existing between the two as to which
should take precedence in cases of conflict."
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Indian Constitution explicitly guarantees the right to petition the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights. 57 Although standing is conferred
under article 32 only to individuals who have themselves suffered a
violation of a fundamental right,58 the judiciary has expanded the
traditional rules of locus standi under this article. In S. P. Gupta &
Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [Judges Appointment and Transfer
case],"' the Court held that should a person who has suffered a rights
trive Principles of Part IV would include the third type of rights described by
Lauterpacht.
53. In the instant case, Justice Bhagwati wrote that "when the Directive Principles of
State Policy have obligated the Central and the State Governments to take steps and
adopt measures for the purpose of ensuring social justice to the have-nots and the handicapped, it is not right on the part of the concerned governments to shut their eyes to the
inhuman exploitation to which the bonded labourers are subjected." Bandhua Mukti
Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 806.
54. Id. at 811-16. See also In re Kerala Education Bill, 1958 A.I.R. (S.C.) 956, 966;
Marwa Manghani v. Sanghram Sampat, 1960 A.I.R. (Punjab) 35, 39.
55. Kesavanada v. State of Kerala, 1973 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1461; M.H. Quareshi v. State of

Bihar, 1958 A.I.R. (S.C.) 731. See also V.G. RAMACHANDRAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 927-43 (2d ed. 1970).

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND

56. In a series of cases the Indian Supreme Court held that the Directive Principles
must conform and run subsidiary to the Fundamental Rights. State of Madras v.
Champatian Dorirajon, 1951 S.C.R. 515; Hanif Queshi v. State of Bihar, 1958 A.I.R.
(S.C.) 731; In Re Kerala Education Bill, 1958 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1956.
Through the 42nd and 44th amendments, Parliament has given the Directive Principles precedence over fundamental rights and reiterated the nonjusticability of the Directive Principles. INDIAN CONST., Part IV, art. 31(C). The fundamental rights are subordi-

nated to Directive Principles. PARAS

DIWAN, ABROGATION

OF

THE

FORTY-SECOND

(1978). Articles 14 and 19 shall not obstruct implementation of any of the
Directive Principles. R.S. SARKAR, AN APPROACH TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (1981).
Article 14 provides that "[t]he State shall not deny to any person equality before the
law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." INDIAN CONST., art. 14.
Article 19 included the right of freedom of speech and expression, the right to assemble,
to form associations and unions, to travel within India, to reside anywhere in India and
to engage in any profession or occupation. Id. art. 19; see generally RAJENDRA SHARMA,
CONFLICT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DIREcTIvE PRINCIPLES (1977).
57. INDIAN CONST., art. 32. "The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this part is guaranteed." Id.
58. Id. See also Asiad Construction Workers, 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 1484.
59. 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) 149.
AMENDMENT
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violation be unable to approach the Court due to a socially or economically disadvantaged position, some other person could represent the
60
aggrieved party for the purpose of judicial redress. Therefore, any citizen or public organization acting bona fide and having a sufficient in6
terest in the litigation can maintain an action on behalf of another. '
Moreover, it was held that when the impoverished of society are concerned, the Court would not require a leave writ petition to be filed,
but would simply accept a letter from an individual acting pro bono
2
publico.6
A number of relevant substantive labor laws provide work time
and manner regulations beyond the blanket prohibitions of bonded labor found in article 23 and the Bonded Labour Act. The Minimum
Wages Act of 1948,6s made applicable to the entire country of India,provided for minimum wage rates,"' normal working hours and days,
overtime,"6 wage schedules for different types of work," and procedures for enforcing the Minimum Wages Act and remedying violations
thereto."
Pursuant to a December 2, 1981 Central Government Notifica60. Id. at 377. This view of standing applied not only to article 32 but also to article
226, governing standing before the High Courts. Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R.
(S.C.) at 813.
61. Judges Appointment and Transfer Case, 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) 149, 151. The parameters of "sufficient interest" would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. [1983]
2 S.C.R. 379 (this statement of the court was edited out of the official reporter). The
government of India, through the Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, sought
to discontinue the terms of certain High Court Judges who did not consent to permanent
appointments in other Courts. The Court held that this violated the Constitution and
conferred standing in a number of practicing attorneys. The plaintiff attorneys' interest
in "preserving the integrity and independence of the judicial system" constituted "sufficient interest" in the litigation. [1983] 2 S.C.R. at 379 (this statement of the court was
also edited out of the official reporter).
Among the cases cited by the Indian Court to support this view of standing was
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). [1983] 2 S.C.R. at 377. In Raines, Justice
Brennan wrote that a defendant might challenge the constitutionality of applications of
a law to others where the application "would itself have an inhibitory effect on freedom
of speech." 362 U.S. at 22.
62. Judges Appointment and Transfer, 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 150-51. See also Asiad
Construction Workers, 1983 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 1483.
63. The Minimum Wages Act of 1948, INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL, Vol. 25 (4th ed. 1979).
64. Id. at § 1. The State of Jammu and Kashmir were the only two states excepted
from the Act's application. Id.
65. Id. §§ 3, 4, 12.
66. Id. §§ 13, 14, 15.
67. Id. § 16.
68. Id. §§ 20-31.
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tion, 9 the minimum wage fixed for miners, which included stone
quarry workers,70 was 9.75 rupies per day for those working above
ground and 11.25 rupies per day for those working below ground.7'1 The
Notification also prescribed separate minimum rates for the different
occupations of shot firer, stone breaker, stone carrier, mud remover
7

and water carrier.

2

The Mines Act of 1952 7 was explicitly recognized by Haryana in a
1982 amendment to the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules of
1964.7' Three new sections to the Rules provided by the Haryana
amendment required that mine lessees and contractors abide by the
Mines Act of 1952.75 Chapters V, VI and VII of the Mines Act of 1952
along with chapters V, VI and IX of the Mines Rules of 1955,7' regulate worker health, safety, wages and hours, and include detailed provisions relating to drinking water, conservancy facilities and injury
compensation."

Two other Central Government Acts relevant to the instant case
are the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act of 197078
[Contract Labour Act] and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act of 1979 [Migrant
Workmen Act] .' The fornier Act obligates every contractor in an es69. Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 822-23.
70. Id. at 823.
71. Id.
72. Id. The Mines Vocational Training Rules (India Code 1966), also specifically required special training for all shot firers. Id.
73. The Mines Act of 1952 India A.I.R. Manual, Vol. 25 (4th ed. 1979).
74. Punjab Minor Mineral Concession (Haryana First Amendment) Rules, India
Subs. Leg. 1982.
75. Id.
76. The Mines Rules, 1955, chs. V, VI, IX; The Mines Act of 1952, supra note 73,
C11a. VN'qI.
77. The Mines Act of 1952, supra note 73. Section 2(i) of the Mines Act of 1952
defines "mine" to include "any excavation where any operation for the purpose of
searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on including stone quarries. "Minerals" as defined in section 2(ii)
include "all substances which can be obtained
from the earth by mining, digging .... " Id.
Although section 3(1)(b) of the Act exempts mines engaged in the extraction of
gravel and building stone, the exemption only applies, according to section 3(1)(b)(i),
when "the workings do not extend below superjacent ground." Id. The stone quarries at
issue did extend below superjaceat ground and the Act was found applicable. Bandhua
Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 817-18.
78. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL, Vol.
11 (4th ed. 1979). (hereinafter Contract Labour Act).
79. Interstate Migrant Worknien (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act of 1979,INDIA A.I.R. MANAL, V oL. 23 4th ed. 197) Ihereinafter Migrant Workmen Act]. Both the Contract Labour Act and the Migrant Workmen Act "are clearly

19861

BONDED LABOR

tablishment with twenty or more contract laborers 0 to provide, among
other things, canteens, restrooms and first aid facilities.8 The latter
Act, along with the Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Central Rules of 1980 [Migrant
Workmen Rules] ,8 provides regulations for wages, recruitment of
workers, compensation for travel and relocation, medical facilities, protective clothing, drinking water, latrines, washing facilities and housing.8" These provisions, pursuant to section 1(a) of the Migrant Workin which five or
men Act, were made applicable to every establishment
84
more inter-state migrant workers were employed.
Before applying this body of law to the facts in Bandhua Mukti
Morcha, Justice Bhagwati first addressed two preliminary objections
raised by the defendants.0s First, the defendants argued that even if
the plaintiff's allegations were assumed to be true, the plaintiff nonetheless lacked standing under article 32 because no fundamental right
of the plaintiff or the workers had been violated.8 6 The Court found
that although anxiety on the part of the defendant mine lessees was
understandable, the objection as urged by the State of Haryana was
"incomprehensible" and "difficult to appreciate" given the allegations
of debt bondage, subhuman working and living conditions and given
the responsibility of state governments to eradicate these practices.8 7
of the reports the Court
The second objection was against the form
88
had ordered and received into evidence.
Responding to the first objection, the Court reasoned that the article 21 right to live with human dignity as interpreted in the Francis
intended to ensure basic human dignity to the workmen ...." Asiad Construction
Workers, 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1473, 1485. Violations of the rights conferred by the Acts are
also violations of article 21 of the Constitution. Id.
80. Section 2(1)(b) of the Contract Labour Act states that workers are "contract Isbourlersi" when they are hired to work in an establishment through a "contractor."
Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 823.
81. Contract Labour Act, supra note 78, §§ 16-20.
82. Migrant Workmen Rules, India Cen. Acts 1980.
83. Id. See Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 819.
84. Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 819. The phrase "Inter-State migrant workmen" is defined pursuant to § 2(1)(e) of the Migrant Workmen Act as "any
person who is recruited by or through a contractor in one State under an agreement or
other agreement for employment in an establishment in another State, whether with or
without the knowledge of the principal employer in relation to such establishment." Id.
85. Id. at 810-17.
86. Id. at 811. Both the Additional Solicitor General appearing for the State of Haryana and Mr. Phadke, the attorney for one of the defendant mine lessees made this argument. Id.
87. Id. at 811.
88. Id. at 812.
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Mullins case s derived "its life breath" from the Directive Principles of
State policy.90 Article 39, clauses (e) and (f) along with articles 41 and
42, in particular, were the source of the right to basic human dignity. 91
Pursuant to these Directives, the article 21 right to human dignity included the assurance of just and humane working conditions, protection of worker health, opportunities for children to develop in a
healthy manner, educational facilities and maternity relief for

Wiomen 9 2

Although the Directive Principles are nonjusticiable, 9 3 the
Bandhua Mukti Morcha Court held that when legislation has been enacted to assure these protections, a state's failure to implement and
observe the legislation would constitute a denial of the article 21 right
to live with human dignity.9 Moreover, Justice Bhagwati reasoned that
article 256, which requires states to exercise their executive power to
ensure compliance with the laws of Parliament, 95 also supported this
conclusion."
Justice Bhagwati further stated that pursuant to the rule set down
in the Asiad Construction Workers case, 97 the State is constitutionally
obligated to ensure that there are no fundamental rights violations of
any of its citizens, particularly when they are members of the weaker
89. Francis Mullins, 1980 A.I.R. (S.C.) 849.
90. Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 811.
91. Id. Article 39(e) of the Indian Constitution provides that "[t]he State shall, in
particular, direct its policy towards securing (e) that the health and strength of workers,
men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not
forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age and strength."
INDIAN CONST., art. 39(e).
Article 39(f) mandates that State policy be directed toward securing "that children
are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of
freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation
and against moral and material abandonment." Id. art. 39(f).
Article 41 provides that "[t]he State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity
and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education
and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement,
and in other cases of undeserved want." Id. art. 41.
Article 42 provides that "[t]he State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief." Id. art. 42.
92. Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 811-12.
93. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
94. Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 812. In his opinion, Justice
Bhagwati was presumably alluding to the aforementioned Acts of the Central Government and State of Haryana.
95.

INDIAN CONST., art.

256.

96. Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 19B4 A.I.R. MS.C.) at B12.
97. 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1473.
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sections of society.9 8 The State of Haryana's obligation to the plaintiffs
was further evidenced by the fact that the State owned the stone quarries at issue pursuant to the Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act
of 1973.'s
The defendants' second objection was that the Court lacked power
to appoint Ashok Srivastava, Ashok Panda and Dr. Patwardhan as investigative commissoners, and that reports of these commissioners
lacked evidentiary value because they were based on ex parte informa10 0
tion and were untested by cross-examination.
The Court responded to this objection by first noting that the interpretation of article 32, which provides the right to move the Court
to enforce fundamental rights and gives the Court procedural powers
to those ends, 0 1 must be guided not by "formalistic canons of con03
the
struction" ' but rather by the Preamble of the Constitution,
Fundamental Rights provisions of Part III' and the Directive Principles of Part IV.1°5 Justice Bhagwati pointed out that article 32(1), the
right to move the Court by "appropriate proceedings" had been interpreted in the Judges Appointment and Transfer case'"s to allow not
only individuals who had themselves suffered rights violations to move
the Court, but that in cases in which the plaintiff is economically and
socially disadvantaged, any member of the public acting bona fide can
move the Court on behalf of that plaintiff. 0 7 Moreover, in such circum98. Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 812.
99. Id. at 812.
100. Id. The defendants also argued that the Commissions were beyond the scope of
Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules of 1966, which governs Court commissions, and
Order XXVI of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure. Id. at 25, 37-38. The Court rejected
this argument pointing out Rule 6 of Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules of 1966,
which provides that nothing in the Rules "shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect
the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends
of justice." Id. at 817.
101. INDIAN CONST., art. 32. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
102. Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 813.
103. INDIAN CONST., Preamble. The Preamble states as follows:
We, the People of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a
Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens:
Justice, social, economic and political; Liberty of thought, expression, belief,
faith and worship, Equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote among
them all Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation; In our Constituent Assembly this twenty-sixth day of November, 1948, do Hereby Adopt, Enact and Give to Ourselves this Constitution.
Id.
104. INDIAN CONST., part III. See notes 30-48 and accompanying text.
105. INDIAN CONST., part IV. See notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
106. 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) 149.
107. Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 829.
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stances a simple letter addressed to the Court on behalf of such disadvantaged person could be regarded as an "appropriate proceeding."' 0 8
Once appropriately addressed, the Court held that pursuant to article 32(2) the Court has the power "to adopt any procedure it considers appropriate in the circumstances of a given case for enforcing a
fundamental right." 10 9 In Bandhua Mukti Morcha, the appointment of
Commissioners was appropriate because it was obviously impossible for
the deprived laborers themselves to produce the relevant and necessary
evidence and similarly difficult for a citizen acting pro bono publico to
produce such evidence.1 10
Justice Bhagwati expressed the view that if the Court were to act
passively in situations in which the deprived sections of society were
suffering fundamental rights violations, "fundamental rights would remain merely a teasing illusion so far as the poor and disadvantaged
sections of the community are concerned.""' Accordingly, the Court
held that the Commissioners' reports furnished prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein."" Therefore, the defendants were to be provided with copies of the reports in the event they wished to dispute
any of the facts or data.118 The weight to be given to the reports would
ultimately be determined by the Court. "'
The Court next considered the general applicability of the pertinent statutory provisions: the Mines Act of 1952,115 the Migrant Workmen Act," 6 the Contract Labour Act,"1 the Minimum Wages Act of
108. Id. Justice Bhagwati argued that the framers of the Indian Constitution did not
prescribe any particular proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental rights because
"they knew that in a country like India, where there is so much of poverty, ignorance,
illiteracy, deprivation and exploitation, any insistence on a rigid formula of proceeding
for enforcement of a fundamental right would become self-defeating because it would
place enforcement of fundamental rights beyond the reach of the common man ..
Id.
109. Id. at 816. Justice Bhagwati reasoned that article 32(2) conferred power in the
Court not only to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari, but the Court also had the power to issue writs "in the nature of" any
high prerogative writ. Id. at 814.
110. Id. at 816.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Although Justice Bhagwati pointed out that the defendants did have opportunities to contest the reports, he criticized at length the dogmatic reliance on adverserial procedures. He implied that the adverserial system as a mechanism for justice breaks
down when potential plaintiffs are suffering severe deprivations of human dignity. Id. at
814-15.
114. Id. at 816.
115. Id. at 817-19. See also Mines Act of 1952, supra note 73, §§ 2, 3, 7-9, 44-46.
116. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 819-22. See also Migrant Workmen Act, supra note 79. The
court discussed §§ 1(4), 2(1)(b), 2(1)(e), 2(1)(g), 4, 8(1), 8(2), 12-16, 25-26, of the Migrant
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194818 and the Bonded Labour Act.'

"

The Mines Act of 1952, the Court held, applied to all stone quarries and in particular to the Faridabad stone quarries at issue. 10 The
applicability of the Migrant Workmen Act and the Contract Labour
Act to the quarries at issue, would have to be determined by further
investigation.121 The applicability of the Minimum Wages Act of 1948
to the plaintiff laborers was not disputed.'11 Both the State of Haryana
and the Central Governments were responsible for ensuring that the
defendant stone crushers and mine lessees complied with all the pertinent statutes.23
With regard to the Minimum Wages Act of 1948, the State and
Central Governments were required to ensure that the workers receive
no less than minimum wage. 12 4 If workers were to be paid per truck
load of stone, the State and Central Governments would be responsible
125
for devising a formula which assured payment of the minimum wage.
Expenses from explosives and drilling would have to be borne by the
mine lessees or "Thekedar" but not the laborers.11 Payment of wages,
Justice Bhagwati ruled, had to be made directly to the workers to prevent unlawful deductions by the Thekedars. 1 7 Surprise checks were to
be conducted by the Central Enforcement Machinery to assure continWorkmen Act.
117. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 822-23. See also Contract Labour Act, supra note 78. The
Court discussed §§ 2(a)(a), 2(1)(b), 2(I)(c), 2(1)(g), 16-21.
118. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 823-24. See also Minimum Wages Act of 1948 supra note
63.
119. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 824-29. See also Bonded Labour Act, supra note 7. The
Court discussed §§ 2(d), 2(f), 2(g), 2(i), 4(1), 4(2)(a), 4(2)(b), 5, 7-12, 14, 15 of the
Bonded Labour Act.
120. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 817. The Court ruled that the defendant mine lessees and
stone crushers were "owners" within § 2(1) of the Mines Act of 1952 and were therefore
liable for observing its provisions. Id. at 919-19. See supra note 74.
121. Id. at 831. With regard to the Migrant Workmen Act, if five or more inter-State
migrant workers, as defined by § 2(1)(e) of the Act, were employed in a particular
quarry, the Act would apply to that quarry. Migrant Workmen Act, supra note 79. See
also supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. The applicability of the Contract Labour
Act depends, inter alia, on whether or not twenty or more contract labourers, as defined
by § 2(1)(b) of the Act, are employed in the establishment at issue. Contract Labour Act
see supra note 78 and accompanying text. In appointing the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Labour to carry out its final order, the Court requested that the Secretary report
on the applicability of these two acts by February 14, 1984. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 831.
122. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 823.
123. Id. at 829.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 830.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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ued compliance. 128
Compliance with the Mines Act of 1952 along with the Mines
Rules of 1955 was ordered by the Court. 2 The State and Central Governments were directed to assure that an ample supply of tested clean
water be kept cool and constantly available for the laborers.'8 0 Noting
that the Patwardhan Report indicated a total lack of conservancy facilities in the defendants' stone quarries,"" the Court ordered compliance

with section 2q of the Mines ikct of 1952 and rules T,2 thvough 364o the
Mines Rules.1 2 These provisions regulated the construction, condition
and number of latrines to be provided; requiring more than just the
"vast open mountain dug-up" which both male and female workers
were forced to use.183
Furthermore, section 21 of the Mines Act of 1952 and rules 40
through 45A of the Mines Rules of 1955 required that medical and
first-aid facilities be provided in the stone quarries. 1 4 Noting the complete absence of such facilities, the Court ordered immediate compliance with these provisions.-" 5
The final and most important act that the Court considered was
the Bonded Labour Act.13 s Noting that the Act required the establishment of a Vigilance Committee in each sub-division of each District,
the Court ordered the State of Haryana to ensure the establishment of
such committees within six weeks of its judgment.8 7
The State of Haryana argued that although the plaintiffs might be
forced laborers they were not bonded laborers within the meaning of
the Bonded Labour Act.'
Although the plaintiff laborers may not
have been allowed to leave the premises of the defendant's stone quarries, the State argued that unless it be proven that the plaintiff laborers were actually working under a bonded debt, they did not qualify
for relief under the Act.ls
In response to this argument, the Court first pointed out that
128. Id.
129. Id. at 831.
130. Id. at 832.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 833.
133. Id. at 832-33.
134. Id. at 833.
135. Id.
136. Bonded Labour Act, India Cen. Acts, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (1976).
137. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 825.
138. Id. "Bonded Labourer" is defined in § 2(f) of the Act to mean "a labourer who
incurs, or has, or is presumed to have incurred a bonded debt." Bonded Labour Act,
India Cen. Acts, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (1776).
139. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 825-26.
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forced labor, whether accompanied by a debt or not, is offensive to the
Directive Principles of State Policy. 4' Justice Bhagwati determined
that the "thrust of the Act" was to prohibit any form of forced labor. " '
He recognized that if laborers were required to prove usurious conduct
to qualify for relief under the Act, the purpose of the Act would be
frustrated as a result of the poverty and illiteracy of the laborers. ""'
Therefore, the Court held that whenever forced labor is proven, a presumption that the laborer is forced to work for some type of economic
consideration would become operative. " Unless the defendant could
rebut this presumption by producing satisfactory evidence, the Court
would proceed by presuming that a forced laborer is a bonded
laborer.'
A primary impediment to implementation of the Act is reluctance
on the part of State Governments to acknowledge the existence of
bonded labor.'4" The Haryana Government was directed to inform all
officials responsible for the implementation of the Act of the importance of effective enforcement of its provisions. 146 Justice Bhagwati
noted that it is not the existence of bonded labor that is a blemish on
to eradicate
the State, but rather, it is the State's failure to take steps
7
debt bondage that is a slur upon the administration."1
The Court determined that in areas where bonded labor is most
prevalent, as in stone quarries, brick kilns and among landless agricultural workers, task forces and labor camps should be established to
help wipe out the practice."' It was also established that "non-political
social action groups and voluntary agencies" should be utilized by the
Vigilance Committees in conjunction with the National Labour Institute to combat bonded labor.' Because most of these laborers are "totally ignorant of their rights and entitlements" and because that lack
of education has been a primary cause of their exploitation, the Court
also directed the Central Board of Workers Education to set up camps
near the Faridabad stone quarries to educate workers about their statutory entitlements and constitutional rights." 0
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 826.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 827.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

ld. at 828.
Id. at 830.
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Rehabilitation of bonded laborers was stressed by the Court. " '
For unless rehabilitated, it is likely that these individuals will eventually slip back into serfdom. "The bonded laborer who is released would
prefer slavery to hunger, a world of 'bondage and (illusory) security' as
against a world of freedom and starvation."' 2 The concept of rehabilitation, the Court reasoned, includes four main features as formulated
by the Secretary of Ministry of Labour for the Government of India.'"
The first stresses that psychological iehabilitation m-st coincide 'With
physical and economic rehabilitation.' " Physical and economic rehabilitation, the second feature, includes the allotment of housing and
arable land, training in animal husbandry and other skills, medical
care, education, the supply of essential commodities and the protection
of civil rights. " The third feature stresses the integration and pooling
of resources among the various State and Central Government entities
involved in the enforcement of the Bonded Labour Act.'" The fourth
feature provides that freed laborers must be given a choice among alternative forms of rehabilitation.5 7 The Court directed the State of
Haryana to follow these four guidelines in establishing an effective program for the rehabilitation of released laborers.'"
The final direction of the Court involved the appointment of the
Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Labour for Government of India,
Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra, to conduct a further investigation of the
Faridabad stone quarries and stone crushers.'" The Joint Secretary' 0
was ordered to visit the stone quarries and stone crushers, and interview the laborers, Thekedars, mine lessees and owners of the stone
crushers to ascertain whether or not the laborers were forced to work
and whether or not they had been given economic advances.' 6 ' The
151. Id. at 828.
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Letter from Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Government of India
(September 2, 1982) discussing rehabilitation of bonded laborers).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. Whether to remain as freed workers in the stone quarries and stone crushers
or return to their place of origin was one alternative. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 829. In appointing the Joint Secretary, the Court disclaimed making an
ultimate finding of fact based on the Srivastava/Panda Report. See supra note 27. Somewhat mollifyingly, the Court indicated to the State of Haryana that it would forbear
from making an ultimate ruling on the presence of bonded labor in the Faribadad quarries until the Joint Secretary had conducted his investigation. Id.
160. Id. The Court noted that Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra had much experience in identifying, releasing and rehabilitating bonded laborers. Id.
161. Id.
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Joint Secretary was also ordered to determine whether those laborers
who were bonded desired to continue work in the quarries or return to
their place of origin."' 2 If the latter was established, the Joint Secretary
was ordered to file an affidavit with the District Magistrate of
Faridabad who would arrange the release and transport of the laborers
back to their homes.163 The State was also ordered to provide the necessary funds for this operation to the District Magistrate.""
The findings of the Joint Secretary were ordered to be documented and submitted to the Court on or before February 28, 1984.1e5
The Court directed that Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra conduct his investigation and prepare his report with an eye toward securing the release and
rehabilitation of bonded laborers, as well as, to ascertain violations of
Minimum Wages Act of 1948, the Migrant Workmen Act, the Contract
Labour Act and the Mines Act of 1952.60

The Indian Constitution, as enacted in 1950, included the article
23 prohibition on bonded labor because of the historical pervasiveness
of the practice.1 67 In 1976, the Central Governments also found it necessary to enact the Bonded Labour Act because "no serious effort was
made to give effect to Article 23 and to stamp out the shocking practice of bonded labour."' s8 These laws, along with numerous other Indian labor laws, provided ample precedent for Justice Bhagwati's decision in Bandhua Mukti Morcha. Moreover, the recent cases relied on
solid legal foundation for the Court's holding. In particular, the Asiad
Construction Workers case1 6 ' involved an almost identical situation.
Bandhua Mukti Morcha, however, went further than the Asiad Construction Workers case in the specificity of practical sanctions provided to assure compliance with the pertinent laws.
Although the circumstances presented in Bandhua Mukti Morcha
confirms that India is still struggling with the problem of bonded labor,
the case reinforces the fact that serious efforts are being made to completely abolish the practice. Although lack of compliance with governmental prescriptive endeavors was acknowledged by the Court, 70° the
specific orders and mandatory timetable provided by Justice Bhagwati
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
ion. Id.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 829-31. The Court summarized its ruling and orders at the end of its opinat 834-37.
Id. at 805.
Id.
1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1473. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) 802, 805.
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evidence a continuing commitment to the abolition of bonded labor.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Court's ruling is the emphasis on the rehabilitation of released laborers."' Nurturing an
awareness among the laborers themselves of their constitutional rights
and legal entitlements, as well as providing all the requisite resources
of self-help, may be a more effective deterrent to bonded labor than
the previous complete reliance on formal and abstract sanctions. Transitional. educational institutions such as those sanctioned by the Court
are an essential first step in breaking the lag between prescriptive
trends and actual practices."
Carmen S. Giordano

171. Id. at 828-30.
172. Id. For further discussion on how the Indian legal system can better aid in the
implementation of human rights, see Dias, Research on Legal Services and Poverty: Its
Relevance to the Design of Legal Services Programsin Developing Countries, 141 WAsH.
UNiv. L.Q. 147 (1975).

